Thomas L. Wilborn kindle Strategic Implications of the U.S. - DPRK Framework Agreement

On October 21, 1994, the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) signed an "Agreed Framework" which is designed to provide the procedure to resolve the dispute over North Korea's nuclear weapons program. If and when successfully executed, it will satisfy U.S. negotiating objectives, but, in the process, propel the United States into the center of North-South conflict. For South Korea, in addition to the explicit benefits of the provisions, it will facilitate more frequent and meaningful communication between the two halves of the now divided peninsula and a gradual, rather than chaotic, path to unification. Generally, the Agreed Framework obligates North Korea to: -eliminate its existing capability to produce weapons grade plutonium; -resume, after several years delay, full membership in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, including the requirement to comply completely with its safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which mandates allowing IAEA inspectors to investigate suspected nuclear waste sites and to place any nuclear material not previously identified under IAEA safeguards. -consistently take steps to execute the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; and engage in North-South dialogue. An international consortium led by the United States (Korea Energy Development Organization [KEDO] ), with South Korea and Japan paying most of the costs, will have provided North Korea with two 1,000 mw(e) light water reactor (LWR) power plants, priced at some $4 billion; and heavy oil, reaching 500,000 tons annually, to compensate for the capacity forfeited by North Korea by freezing its graphite-modulated reactors. The United States and the DPRK agreed to open liaison offices in the capital of the other, and reduce barriers to trade and investment. As of the end of February 1995, Pyongyang has complied scrupulously with technical aspects of the agreement, but has resisted the resumption of dialogue with Seoul. It also was threatening to reject the contract with KEDO, presumably to be presented in April, which will specify South Korean LWR power plants. Washington's obligations to implement the agreement would be challenging under the best of circumstances, when all the principal parties shared a broad political consensus. But only a limited consensus exists, with serious differing interpretations of several provisions of the Agreed Framework. Moreover, there may be significant political changes within all of the governments: United States, ROK, Japan, China, Russia, and the DPRK-involved in carrying out the agreement. Therefore, to see that North Korea's nuclear weapons program is terminated, North-South dialogue is resumed, and all of the other requirements of the Agreed Framework are met, Washington necessarily will be involved in sensitive and extremely difficult negotiations. It must simultaneously be a mediator between the DPRK, a long-time enemy, and the ROK, a long-time ally, and continue to be ally and friend of South Korea. How the United States performs this role will not only affect the global campaign against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, North-South confrontation on the Korean peninsula, and regional stability, but also U.S. credibility among allies everywhere.